Journal article
A secure control framework for resource-limited adversaries
A Teixeira, I Shames, H Sandberg, KH Johansson
Automatica | Published : 2015
Abstract
Cyber-secure networked control is modeled, analyzed, and experimentally illustrated in this paper. An attack space defined by the adversary's model knowledge, disclosure, and disruption resources is introduced. Adversaries constrained by these resources are modeled for a networked control system architecture. It is shown that attack scenarios corresponding to denial-of-service, replay, zero-dynamics, and bias injection attacks on linear time-invariant systems can be analyzed using this framework. Furthermore, the attack policy for each scenario is described and the attack's impact is characterized using the concept of safe sets. An experimental setup based on a quadruple-tank process control..
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Grants
Awarded by Stiftelsen för Strategisk Forskning
Funding Acknowledgements
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 608224, the EIT-ICT Labs through the project SESSec-EU, the Swedish Research Council under Grants 2009-4565 and 2013-5523, and the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation. The material in this paper was partially presented at the 1st International Conference on High Confidence Networked Systems (HiCoNS), April 17-18,2012, Beijing, China. This paper was recommended for publication in revised form by Associate Editor Giancarlo Ferrari-Trecate under the direction of Editor Ian R. Petersen.